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Abstract: Trade continues to expand at an unprecedented pace under the WTO regime and is 
a prime vehicle for development. Yet the gap between rich and poor countries continues to widen. 
This paper aims to ascertain the true meaning and purpose of development in WTO law. It 
demonstrates that despite constant mention of ‘development’ in several provisions, there is 
vagueness or uncertainty in the use, meaning, and purpose of development in WTO law. It argues 
that this definitional anomaly lends development or the pursuit of development objectives an uneasy 
alliance with trade discipline, and thereby with its developing trading partners. It recommends an 
appreciable definition of development from a trade perspective. 
I. Introduction 
 
The process to development or its discourse has been likened to an ideology that is operationalised (by the World 
Bank) not according to some clearly discernible unitary model which renders predictable development decisions.1 
Rather, it relies on conflicting contestation of meanings that eventually shape the form of intervention that 
constrains and transforms development process in a way that makes it easier to apprehend for political 
mobilization.2 The notion of development is not static, having evolved from the ‘grips of colonialism and the 
liberating movement of the New International Economic Order’.3 It has a fragmented constitutional and normative 
character and function in international law, owing largely to the differing perspectives on ways to facilitate 
development.  
According to Qureshi and Ziegler, some basics characteristics define the normative framework of 
development in international law. First, there is ‘traditional model’ of rights and responsibilities of developed and 
developing members of the international community. Second, there is the ‘facilitative and cooperative framework’ 
that includes development assistance and preferential treatment in trade. Third is the ‘integrationist framework’, 
which facilitates the full participation of developing states in the international economy. Then there is ‘externally 
oriented regulatory framework’, a standards setting structure within the international economy. Finally, there is the 
‘communal framework’ ensuring that common resources are shared by all. The normative content of the various 
spheres may be hard, soft or aspirational.4 
The history of development found beginnings in individual projects and the concept of the “production 
function”. Its objectives derived from input-output models and macroeconomic projections.5 A reconceptualisation 
of development began with growing recognition that markets do not create conditions for their own success 
separate from local context. This reconceptualisation decentres the focus on economic growth to a concept of 
development broadened by pursuit of human development (of which income is only an aspect) and requires equal 
consideration to ‘political, social and legal development’.6 These multiple aspects of development are 
compounded in Sen’s concept of ‘development as freedom’, which has a goal to enhance people’s capacities and 
choices,7 and together they reflect in the promotion of a “Comprehensive Development Framework” which 
incorporates a social agenda in policy recommendations. 8  
In international law, certain fundamental principles relating to development are identifiable. Foremost is the 
notion of developing countries especially with regards the distribution of rights and duties, differentiation between 
states according to the level of their development and special needs, and in economic relations, the cost, and 
                                                          
1 Ngugi J., (2006) p.322 
2 Ibid 
3 Qureshi  & Ziegler (2007) p.489  
4 Ibid pp.489-490 
5 Picciotto R., (2004) p.355  
6 Trubek & Santos (2006) p.7  
7 Sen (2000) 
8 See Trubek & Santos (2006) p.7; Rittich (2006) p.207 
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benefits arising from membership of international organisations. 9 Another principle is the “right to development,” 
recognised as a process involving the development of economic, social cultural and political aspects of human 
life.10 Next is the principle of sustainable development, a norm of customary international law, which aims at 
reconciling development goals and environmental objectives.11  
At the turn of the millennium, globalisation concerns engendered the reconditioning of development 
objectives as a global agenda, with emphasis on collective responsibility for achieving the millennium 
development goals (MDGs).12 The MDGs aim at ending poverty and hunger, universal education; gender equality; 
improving child and maternal health; combating HIV/Aids and environmental sustainability.  
The MDG goals further reiterated  the need to develop global partnerships for development  particularly in 
relation to developing further an open trading and financial system that is rule based, predictable and non-
discriminatory while addressing the ‘special needs’ of developing countries with targets for development aid, debt 
relief and enhanced  tariff and quota-free market access .13 With no multilateral regime which covers the ‘gambit 
of development issues’; aspects are integrated into international trade and monetary law.14 However, there are 
several institutions with mandate to address international development issues. 
So far, we see an explicit inclusion of rule-based trading system within the broader framework of 
development goals. This inclusion could, from a legal perspective pose a conflict between the challenge of 
discerning the law from the aspirations of nation states, and the principal economic quest to fathom optimum ways 
of facilitating development. 15 Within the mainstream development community, debates now largely focus upon 
the way to conceive and merge economic/social agenda, the relationship between the social, and the 
macroeconomic or financial dimensions of globalisation and the means by which social concerns are to be 
furthered.16 At the WTO, even a traditional multilateral trade round was reinvented as a ‘Development agenda’17. 
Article 2 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration is explicit on the objective of promoting economic development and 
alleviation of poverty in poor countries.18 Development is now at the heart of the WTO agenda, with a special 
committee for trade and development. 
In spite of the centrality of the ‘development principle’ ‘the development dimension has neither been 
sufficiently articulated, nor coherently structured in the architecture of international trade agreements’.19 Its 
meaning remain implicit, uncertain or submerged.This anomaly represents a basis for tensions among the 
developed and developing members, such as, on questions over whether or not new negotiations should 
fundamentally alter balances of rights and obligations of the Members in pursuit of development objectives.20  
Definitional uncertainty also underscores criticisms of the “trade and” linkages. One such is that trade only 
recuperates the legitimacy of other regimes for itself,21  and allowing for the creation of dissention, disagreement, 
incoherence and indeterminacy.  
 
                                                          
9 Qureshi & Ziegler (2007) p.491 
10 See Article 1 and Article 3(3) Declaration on the Right to Development, (adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986, UN Doc A/41?53 1986; See also Principle 3 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development June 13, 1992, adopted by the UNCED at Rio de Janeiro UN Doc A/CONF. 
151/26 (Vol.1) (1992) ILM 874 (Rio Declaration) 
11Separate opinion of Judge Weramantry in Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 1997, ICJ Reports 
15 September 1997, GL No. 92 para.140; Rio Declaration Principle 4; Schwartz (2005). 
12UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/goals.html#; 
(accessed 07/08/08);  Also Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey 
Mexico March 18-22 2002 (UN Pub Sales No.E.02.II.A.7) Ch.1 Res 1 annex Johannesburg Declaration and Plan 
of Implementation UN Doc A/CONF.199/20/Rev.1, Annex at 1–5, and 2, Annex at 7–77, (Johannesburg 
Principles) 
13.See also Johannesburg Principles ; For other UN Partners on the MDGS see 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.shtml (accessed 08/08/08) 
14 Qureshi & Ziegler (2007) p.488 
15 See generally Qureshi & Ziegler (2007) p.489ff 
16 Rittich (2006) at 207 
17 Sutherland (2005) p.365 
18 Doha Declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 20 November 2001 available at http://www.wto.org  
19 Qureshi (2003) p.2 
20 See Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, ‘Special and Differential Treatment Provisions’ 
TN/CTS/W/3/Rev.2 (17 July 2002) at 22.6; see also Chang (2007) pp.553–570 
21 Lang (2007) P.524; also Beckett J, “Fragmentation, Openness, and Hegemony” Unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author  
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To overcome such consequences it is important to ascertain the meaning and scope of development in 
WTO law. Should we look for its fulfilment from substantive norms, procedural rules, or trade objectives? Should 
development be determined in terms of trade income, investment capital, individual welfare gains, or distributional 
issues; or should one construe development from the global economic outcome of trade liberalisation? All these 
questions call for judgements on the importance of trade to development, the role of trade in the global 
development agenda and the impact of trade on development. However, this is not the focus of this paper. Nor is 
the focus to list provisions that tend to favour developing countries or to discuss their fairness or effectiveness.  
Rather the paper will analyse the content of relevant WTO rules to ascertain the development dimension of 
trade terms. It will draw to some extent on the paradigm of development principles in international law discussed 
above to contrast trade-led development from broader development goals. It will also establish the co-relation 
between ‘developing’ status, special treatment, and development ‘needs’. In addition, using economic rationality 
and prevailing theories of law and development, and WTO concept of building trade capacity, the paper will 
unravel trade and development complexities. The article then recommends an appropriate direction of 
development in trade terms. 
 
2. Evolving concept of development in world trading system 
 
The notion of development has been a long-standing objective of the GATT/WTO—as demonstrated by the 
preamble paragraphs to GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement, and the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001. Some 
of the objectives include raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and growing volume of real 
income, expanded production of effective demand of goods and services trade, and environmentally sustainable 
development. “Encouraging development and economic reform” is also among the fundamental principles of 
WTO law. Others include Most-favoured-Nation (MFN), idea of non-discrimination amongst trading partners; 
National treatment, advocating equal treatment of foreign and domestic products and freer trade through lowering 
trade barriers; predictability and stability of the system assured through ‘binding’ commitments, transparency and 
surveillance of national trade rules and policies.22 
Starting in the 1950s, GATT rules were changed several times to address development concerns. Almost all 
these amendments conferred on developing countries special and differentiated treatment (SDT), by making 
exceptions to the basic GATT structure of non-discrimination and reciprocity. SDT was based on the rationale that 
equal treatment or unequal economies simply perpetuated economic inequality and that only SDT could mitigate 
the negative effects of economic asymmetries between the developed and developing countries.23 However, with 
the Uruguay round, and inception of the ‘single package’ deal, SDT provisions focused not on problems that poor 
states face because of economic under development, but on the problems they face as parties to the deal. The new 
arrangement, according to Dunnoff, moved from "non-reciprocal approach to obligations to a non-reciprocal 
approach to implementation”24   
 
2.1 ‘Developing’ Status, Differential treatment and Preferences 
 
 Developing countries are a highly diverse group often with very different views and concerns, who increasingly 
look to trade as a vital tool in their development efforts.25 In the WTO the concept of development is linked with 
status interaction between “developed countries”, “developing countries” and “least developed countries” (LDCs). 
Members announce for themselves whether they are “developed” or “developing” countries and LDCs as those the 
United Nations recognize as such. The categorization is important in development context for two reasons: 
entitlement to special treatment and application of concept of “needs”. 
 
Entitlement to special treatment 
 
First, a members’ designation or recognition as either developing’ or LDC countries entitles them to “special, 
differential and more favourable treatment” (SDT) which requires developed countries to treat developing 
countries more favourably than other WTO members. Amongst the favorable treatment provisions are longer time 
                                                          
22 ‘Principles of the Trading System’ available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
(accessed 07/07/08) 
23 Dunnoff  (2003) at.154; Ochieng (2007) at 374 (citing Yani); Garcia (2000)  
24 Dunnoff  (ibid) 
25See infra (note. Error! Bookmark not defined.); See generally,  Verdiraime  (1996) at 164-197 
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periods for implementing agreements; measures to increase their trading opportunities through greater market 
access, and support to help build their infrastructure.26  
Also  developing countries could get ‘preferential tariff treatment’ under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) Schemes,27 ‘differential and more favourable treatment’ with respect to the provisions of the 
GATT concerning non-tariff measures, and  under GATT Part 4 “Trade and Development”, ‘non-reciprocity’ of 
commitments in trade negotiations between developed and developing countries.28 There are additional provisions 
for ‘special treatment’ of LDCs.29   It must also be mentioned that other members may deny benefit of unilateral 
preference schemes and can challenge the use of the special differential provisions available to developing 
countries. 
The objective behind the various provisions are mainly to enable developing countries and LDCs 
respectively to participate better in the multilateral system to facilitate and promote trade, and to have improved 
market access for their products, and hasten economic development. However, there is the tendency for countries 
to choose ‘developing’ status to be able to get benefit of the trade preferential privileges. For instance, an attempt 
by some countries to create a category that would enjoy similar status to LDCs (e.g. small and vulnerable 
economies) met resistance by other developing countries that feared that this could lead to further discrimination 
between developing countries and prejudice their interests.30   
Ochieng also suggests that developed and developing countries are still caught up in the dualistic set of 
logic that resulted from the compromises made on the question of reciprocity and SDT provisions. For developed 
countries the notion of reciprocity remains that free trade is welfare enhancing for both developed and developing 
countries; while for developing countries, the economic logic of non-reciprocity is that the trade needs of 
developing countries are substantially different from those of developed countries, hence the two types of 
economies should not be subject to the same trade rules.31  
 
Application of the concept of ‘needs’ 
 
Designation of ‘developing’ status is also important in trade and development context because of its link with the 
concept of ‘needs’. Through out the WTO agreements and instruments, there is consistent recognition that 
developing countries and LDCs have ‘special needs’, ‘individual development, financial and trade needs’ 
‘administrative and institutional capability needs’, economic development needs’, and the need to “secure a share 
in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development”. 32  According 
to the WTO Appellate Body in EC Tariff preferences case, 33 the word "commensurate" in this phrase leaves open 
the possibility that developing countries may have different needs according to their levels of development and 
particular circumstances. In addition, that ‘members' "respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development” may vary according to the different stages of development of different Members.34  
 In the immediate context, we observe the content of development in terms of ‘proportionality of 
entitlement’ to international trade gains, ‘proportionality of trade commitments’, and ‘entitlement’ to trade-
focussed development assistance to build trade capacity. In other words, the  effect of the respective needs jointly 
or severally must determine the level of developing countries , contribution, commitment and concessions in trade 
relations, their qualification for and entitlement to special and differential treatment, preferences and assistance, 
and the economic and trade capacities or potential. I examine the development content of building trade capacity 
later in this paper. 
 
                                                          
26 For a summary of SDT provisions  for developing countries and LDCs in other Uruguay round agreements see  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/anexii_e.doc (accessed 02/06/08); For discourse on the effectiveness 
of the SDT provisions for development purposes see: Chang (2007) at 553–570; Mitchell, (2006); Lester 
et.al.,(2008) at.784; Hudec, (1987)) at 27- 28 
27 The Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of "generalized, 
non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24) 
28 DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT RECIPROCITY AND FULLER 
PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) (Enabling Clause) 
29 For  LDCs’ SDT provisions, see WT/COMTD/W/135, 5 October 2004 available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/COMTD/W135.doc (accessed 07/07/08) 
30Ismail, (2005) at 398–403  
31 Ochieng (2007) at 390-391 
32 Preamble and Article 11(2) of the WTO Agreement; see also the Enabling Clause (supra n.Error! Bookmark 
not defined.) 
33Appellate Body Report,  European Communities — Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, Adopted 20 April 2004, WT/DS246/AB/R  
34 Ibid Para 161 
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However, there remains the problem of assessment of ‘needs’. Does this imply ‘needs of developing 
countries’ or ‘development needs’?  Is it to represent individualised, ‘needs’ of developing countries or collective? 
Who determines whether the particular need of the developing country is a trade-led development need; is the 
determination to be to be subjective or objective; or is there a general standard on which the determination should 
base? The closest we can get to these considerations is the EC tariff Preferences case.35  
In that case, India challenged the conditions of tariff preferences accorded by the EC under the EU’s 
‘special’ GSP drug arrangement scheme for combating drug production and trafficking. In analysing provisions of 
the Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body made some clear statements as to what considerations could be relevant 
in the determination of ‘needs’ for purposes of application of the GSP scheme. They Appellate Body found that 
the qualification of the GSP as "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory" imposes obligations on 
preference-granting countries to make available identical tariff preferences to all “similarly situated” beneficiaries. 
They also held that the preferential treatment under a GSP scheme should "respond positively" to the 
"development, financial and trade needs of developing countries".36 On the question of whether the itemised needs 
covers the "needs" of developing countries collectively, the Appellate Body finds that there is no explicit 
requirement and obligation under paragraph 3(C) of the Enabling Clause to respond to needs of ‘all’ or ‘each and 
every’ developing countries.  
Yet, who determines what particular ‘needs’ must be responded to positively by developed countries, and 
how should the response be channelled in trade terms? On this point, the Appellate Body observes that the types of 
needs to which a response is envisaged are limited to "development, financial and trade needs" and not to “any 
kind of response to any claimed need of developing countries”.37 In their view, a "need" cannot be characterized as 
one of the specified "needs of developing countries" in the sense of paragraph 3(c) based merely on an assertion to 
that effect by, for instance, a preference-granting country or a beneficiary country. Rather, when a claim is made, 
the existence of a "development, financial [or] trade need" must be assessed according to an objective standard and 
‘broad-based recognition’ of a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments 
adopted by international organizations, could serve as such a standard. 38 
Further, the Appellate Body considered that in the context of a GSP scheme, the particular need at issue 
must be such that it can be effectively addressed through tariff preferences. Accordingly, the expectation that 
developed countries will "respond positively" to the "needs of developing countries" suggests that a sufficient 
nexus should exist between, respective preferential treatment measure and, the likelihood of alleviating the 
relevant "development, financial [or] trade need".39 But in this case The Appellate body found that if the EU 
regulation had a ‘prerequisite’ or ‘objective criteria’ of including or removing beneficiaries from the arrangements 
on the basis that they are no longer ‘similarly situated’ or "similarly affected by the drug problem", this would 
have fulfilled the ‘need’. However, the Appellate Body did not examine per se whether the Drug Arrangements are 
consistent with the obligation contained in paragraph 3(c) to "respond positively to the development, financial and 
trade needs of developing countries".40 
What the Appellate body is suggesting is that developing countries needs are wide and varied, but must be 
limited to ‘development, financial and trade needs’. The source of claim to such needs should be drawn from  
broadly recognised  needs, not only in WTO agreements, but also from multilateral instruments of international 
organisations and must be assessed from an ‘objective standard’, rather than on developing countries or preference 
granting states’ assertions. Several problems emerge from the Appellate Body’s elaboration on the concept of 
needs.  
Firstly, in its findings on who may assert claims to development needs, the Appellate Body creates an 
uncertainty over ownership of development ‘needs’ and priorities, and further compounds this in suggesting that 
these can be sourced outside the WTO agreements. Also, ‘broadly recognised needs’ does not translate to 
particular ‘development, financial and trade needs’ that a developing country member may have.  
Moreover,  even if these ‘broadly recognised needs’ are assumed under the broader development goals, the 
practice is for developing countries to have ownership of national development strategies. Even the Integrated 
framework, which supports LDC governments in trade capacity building, follows this practice by providing 
assistance to “capacity building needs’ identified by each of the LDC governments and other national 
stakeholders.41 There is also concern that to include other areas of international policy in the WTO is in effect a 
                                                          
35 EC Tariff Preferences, (supra n.Error! Bookmark not defined.) 
36 Ibid Para 148-158 (emphasis added) 
37 Appellate Body Report  (supra n.Error! Bookmark not defined.) Para 163 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid, Para 163-164 
40 Ochieng (2007) at 363–395; Lester et.al (2008) 
41The Integrated Framework for Least Developed Countries 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/if_e.htm (Integrated Frame work)  
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call for a different policy from that mandated by respective international organisations.42 It might therefore be 
useful to consider Hoekmann’s recommendation for the adoption of a ‘new development framework’ in the WTO, 
which determines the reach of disciplines.43 
 Second, the Appellate Body’s ruling leaves no correlation between positive response to development need 
and positive outcome of the response. Issues of uncertainty of the life span of preferences, eroding preferential 
margins, and the inability for some developing producers to respond adequately to preferences may leave 
beneficiary members with no significant impact on trade.44 Also, ‘positive or adequate response’ of  specific 
preference granting programme may not necessarily enhance developing countries development potential or 
directly affect their development condition but will instead aim to address priorities and values of the preference 
granting country as leverage in international relations. 
An example is the concern of African Trade Ministers, that partnership under African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) will lure African governments to give in on the new issues that the US want to introduce 
into the WTO and  which, they opposed.45 
I submit that the assessment of development needs in trade terms must encompass issues that reflect 
“development, financial and trade needs of developing countries” in the conjunctive and not, as separate and 
distinct analysis of these objectives as alternatives.  Adoption of the conjunctive meaning would limit 
interpretation of development to where these have trade financial and development implications, as opposed to the 
broad development framework. This concept of trade-led development — the rationale of addressing conjunctive 
development, finance and trade needs for development— also evinces in the GATT /WTO infant industry and 
balance of payment exceptions examined. 
 
2.2 Economic rationality, trade law and development 
 
The notion of development in world trade law also represents an objective to promote economic development, 
raise general standards of living and employment. Here some basic economic rationality underpins trade law, 
which is the vehicle for promoting trade-led development in developing countries.  
Article 18 of the GATT was included in 1954-55, as a development based exception for developing 
countries particularly ‘economies of which can only support low standards of living’ and are in the early stages of 
development.’ The provision allows for establishment and protection of infant industry and government assistance 
to promote particular industry with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people. Developing 
countries could also impose quotas in order to secure balance of payment, and to ensure a level of reserves 
adequate for the implementation of economic development programmes.46 Further Developing countries could use 
GATT Article 12 (balance of payment exception to GATT article 11, which is the normal rules for other members) 
in aid of “domestic policies directed towards full and productive employment or towards development of 
economic resources”. 
The procedures and caveats to application of these provisions have warranted criticisms to the effect that 
they do not necessarily help achieve growth and development and are inadequate vehicle for lifting poor countries 
out of poverty. 47 It is nonetheless, important to explore trade-led development context in economic rationality and 
theory of law and development.  
 
Comparative advantage, liberalisation and development  
 
The economic rationality underlying the GATT article 18 provisions is that economic development is a pursuit of 
public function or state intervention in establishment and protection of manufacturing industries (Import 
substitution) based on the principles of comparative advantage and trade liberalisation. The rationale is that the 
process of economic development entails creation of new industries and that temporary support from government 
could promote long-term development. According to Stiglitz and Charlton, the industry argument justifies 
temporary government intervention to redress market failures and pioneering firms may bring  benefit to the 
                                                          
42 Dunnoff  (2003) at.155 
43 Hoekman (2005) 405–424 at .407 
44 Mueller, (2008) 
45 Chakravarthi R., “Africa: NGOs start campaign against US AGOA” available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/agoa.htm   (accessed 10/08/08) 
46 See GATT Articles 18(2)(a)&(b) 18(9) (10); 18(13); See also Panel Report, India— Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, Adopted 20 August 1999, WT/DS90/R  
47 Matsushita et al; (2006); Hoekman(2005) at.405-424; See also Article 27(1) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
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economy, when they invest in providing workers with new knowledge, technology transfer, or skills which 
become a ‘public good’ that will become available to all firms.48  
This rationality is in line with the classical law and development thinking of the 1950s-1960s wherein law 
was primarily a tool that the “developmental state” could use for economic management, to remove traditional 
barriers and to create formal structures for macro economic control and to change economic behaviour.49  Trade 
law in this context should be an instrument of effective state intervention in the economy to regulate public sector 
corporations, manage complex exchange controls and import regulations to attain trade led economic development 
through industrialisation. 
How does this industry protection and government assistance argument synchronise with the liberalisation 
economic rationale for development? The 1980s developmental thinking became concerned with the role of 
Markets (as opposed to State) in economic development. Development policy mechanism in this era was to 
transform command economies to market systems and integrating developing countries into the world economy.50  
This “neoliberal market” development policy advocates forging economic growth through capital markets, 
fiscal discipline, promoting free trade, encouraging foreign investment, serving larger markets, lowering cost of 
production, and improving efficiency of local production through competition from foreign firms. The judiciary 
(or dispute settlement mechanisms) has a role to restrain state and facilitate markets, but also to provide fidelity 
and predictability to the law.51 These are all trade-led development parameters of the WTO principles of 
comparative advantage and liberalisation. Implementation of these objectives occur through a trend of forcing the 
‘narrow ‘straitjacket of policy harmonisation’ of trade and industry on developing countries as a vehicle for 
attaining economic growth. 52  
However Stiglitz and Charlton, argue that it is inappropriate for the world trading system to be 
implementing rules which circumscribe  the ability of the developing countries  to use both trade and industry 
policies to promote industrialisation and economic development through liberalisation.53 Trade liberalisation is 
supposed to deliver gains as resources are transferred from protected sectors, in which a country does not have 
comparative advantage, to those sectors where it is more efficient and where it can export more successfully. 
However, in developing countries the constraint to growth of new export sectors is not the lack of resources 
including labour, since these are available in vast reserves and usually unemployed. So trade liberalisation is not 
required to free-up these resources for use in new industries. 54 
They  further suggest that there is still a lot that economist do  not know about the process of development 
and therefore, in areas of trade and industry, developing countries should be given freedom to develop their own 
policy strategies tailored to their own ‘idiosyncratic circumstances’. Thus, complimentary policies should be used 
to ease the other constraints55  to developing successful export industries rather than imposing liberalisation by 
removing protection given to domestic industries.56 
 
2.3 Trade capacity and Development 
 
According to the WTO, building trade capacity will enable developing countries to participate more fully in global 
trading, trade more effectively and in consequence to enable them alleviate poverty and raise living standards.57 
Development via trade capacity has several dimensions in the WTO regime. 
 
Human, institutional and infrastructure capacity 
 
Development translates into enhancing human, institutional and infrastructure capacity. Human capacity enhances 
through “technical assistance” for training trade professionals, towards helping officials better understand complex 
WTO rules and disciplines so that they can implement WTO agreements, and negotiate effectively.58 “Institutional 
                                                          
48 Stiglitz & Charlton (2006) 20-21 
49 Trubek and Santos (2006)  
50 Ibid at.2 
51 Trubek and Santos (2006) at.2; Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) at 13-17 
52 Stiglitz and Charlton, Ibid 
53 Ibid at  17 
54 Ibid at 6 
55 Such constraints include:  as technology backwardness, high trade and transport costs, skilled labour, lack of 
social safety nets, insurances, credit availability weak government institutions 
56 Stiglitz & Charlton (2006) at 28 
57 DECISION ON MEASURES IN FAVOUR OF LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Clause 1; 
alsohttp://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/build_tr_capa_e.htm  
58See also Agreement On Technical Barriers To Trade (Art 11(2) (4) And (5);   
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capacity” is enhancing of institutions and businesses that governments rely upon for trade such as customs and 
national standardisation authorities. “Infrastructure capacity” is the physical setup required for trade to happen, - 
roads, ports, and telecommunications- but this is largely the responsibility of other international organizations.59 
 The essence of technical cooperation and assistance also ensures that other international institutions, 
national development agencies, and donor support could provide assistance in building trade capacity. For 
instance, the Integrated Framework (IF) (a joint technical assistance programme) aims to support LDC 
governments in trade capacity building and integrating trade issues into overall national development strategies.60 
Generally, the IF involves a four-part process. First is on awareness- building on the importance of trade for 
development. Next is Diagnostic for a Trade Integration Strategy (DTIS), a study to identify constraints to traders, 
sectors of greatest export potential, and a plan of action for integrating into the global trading system. Then there is 
the process of integrating the plan of action into the national development plan, such as the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Process (PRSP). The final stage involves the implementation of a plan of action in partnership with the 
development cooperation community. 
 
Trade financing for development 
 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, WTO members became interested in the issue of how trade-related 
measures can contribute to find a durable solution to problems of debt and financial instability and crises in 
developing countries.61 Trade finance issues for development include, coherence in global financial policy, 
improving flows of trade-financing (for example letters of credit and other documentary credit) in particular by 
encouraging regional development institutions to expand WTO-compatible and innovative ways of finance. Trade 
finance facilitation programs such as guarantees covering the payment risk of an import/export between two 
countries  are important consideration in facilitating trade led development.62 
But here again developing countries and their developed counterparts have different views on the trade 
financing development agenda. The EU and the US welcome the mandate on coherence in global financial policy 
but with focus on addressing “concrete topics” on trade and finance. They prefer a modus where work of other 
institutions would ideally be better integrated and coordinated with that of the WTO, keeping in mind respective 
competencies.63 The developing countries on the other hand want more focus on individual constraints giving that 
their “development, financial and trade needs” are wide and varied. They therefore seek to have permanent body 
to continue trade and finance deliberations.64 
 
Development through “Aid for trade”  
 
Aid for Trade (AfT) is a global initiative — launched at the WTO's 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference — to 
scale up international financial assistance for trade capacity building in developing countries. 65.  AfT comprises 
aid that finances trade-related technical assistance, trade-related infrastructure and aid to develop productive 
capacity.66 An “all encompassing definition (in terms of objectives), would cover for example, trade and 
regulations;  trade development activities; support to address supply-side constraints (infrastructure); support for 
micro-economic adjustment (worker training, social safety nets, targeted subsidies); support for a macroeconomic 
adjustment (preference erosion, fiscal revenue losses, impact of changes in the prices); [and]commodity price 
stabilisation.”67  
Aid flows may affect trade flows, either because of the general economic effects they induce in the 
recipient country, or because aid is directly tied to trade (when they reflect conditionality or additional 
dimensions), or because it reinforces bilateral economic and political links or a combination of all three.68 
According to Pascal Lamy, “More Aid for Trade” is not about rebalancing WTO rules in a more development-
                                                          
59 See generally, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/build_tr_capa_e.htm  
60 Integrated Framework (supra n.Error! Bookmark not defined.) 
61 Paragraph 36 Doha Declaration 
62 Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance - Expert Group Meeting on Trade Finance - 25 April 2008 -  
WT/WGTDF/W/38  July 2008; and Report of the Meeting of 14 September 2007 WT/WGTDF/M/15 27 
September 2007; 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid; see generally also “Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance” 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_wkgp_trade_debt_finance_e.htm  
65 See Paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
66 Aid for Trade at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm 
67 Laird (2007)  
68 Eisenmann and Verdier (2007) at 481-507. 
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friendly way, nor is it a substitute for better trade rules. It is an important complement to a fairer trading system”.69 
The steps towards mobilizing AfT include the making of trade capacity and infrastructure a national priority over 
and above ‘building more roads and bridges’ by ‘focusing on the profound global economic changes’, and finding 
new ways to finance and implement projects regionally, more efficiently and effectively. Focus on the private 
sector, especially on the incentives that are required to leverage private resources is also vital.70  
However, there are concerns over the license to donors to converge or maintain interaction between 
respective policies and instruments of trade, Aid and development. The “welfare worsening” effects of such 
interaction has been well documented, such as where value of exports (of tied aid) from donor country can exceed 
value of aid; or tendency to use AfT as duplicitous bargaining for market access.71 
 
Transfer of technology and development 
 
The role of technology in development is undisputed as both a critical determinant and an outcome of rising 
incomes and also, as critical driver of economic progress.72  In consideration of the ‘special development, financial 
and trade needs’ of developing countries, a number of provisions in the WTO agreements recognise their weak 
technological base and the need for a transfer of technology to take place between developed and developing 
countries.73 The WTO Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology is considering ways in which 
technology can be transferred to developing countries to enhance development within the trade framework.74. 
Some of the indicators for trade led technology transfer for development identified by a World Bank and 
UNCTAD respective studies include the following:-basic infrastructure; macro economic stability; trade in capital 
goods, in business and professional services (migration); FDI flows and expenditure of transnational corporations 
in research and development; payment of royalties and licensing fees by the users to technology providers; 
education for creating absorptive capacity and growth of industrial alliances. These are drivers of technology 
diffusion, technological performance and productivity increases in the global market place. 75 
From these indicators we could observe that technology transfer for development in trade framework 
encompasses trade in goods, services and intellectual property and FDI regimes, and on the extent to which 
companies engage in research and development. Developing countries could exploit the linkage between 
technology transfer and Article 1(2) (b) & (C) of the GATS regime of ‘commercial presence’ of companies under 
Modes 3, and the temporary movement of natural persons under Mode 4. However, on the more general transfers 
(under GATS Article IV (1) (a)), that should strengthen their domestic services capacity, efficiency and 
competitiveness, developing countries access should be on ‘commercial basis.’ 
 In addition, in context of trips, Article 7 (also 66) developing countries will benefit from technological 
innovation, transfer and dissemination of technology because of protecting and enforcing intellectual property 
rights of developed countries companies. Finally, there is the linkage of foreign investment with domestic 
enterprises and the interface between technology and human resources as these acquire and apply skills with 
technology diffusion. 
The development dimension of trade and technology transfer here is attunes with liberalization, trade 
facilitation, trade capacity, efficiency and competitiveness, investment promotion and enterprise development in 
developing countries. It does not address broader development goals such as poverty alleviation, though it may 
influence these indirectly by outcome of rising incomes, and welfare enhancement as trade opens up, firms 
increase productive capacity and trade more across borders. It still does not address issues of technology life 
cycles, technology dumping by developed countries, trade and inequality, bargaining power in global production 
chains and the distribution of gains from trade, the effects of terms of trade on poverty, the effects of primary 
commodity dependence, and the relationship between export and import instability and vulnerability.76 
 
                                                          
69 Lamy “Aid-for-Trade initiative “critical” for Latin America and the Caribbean” available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl68_e.htm#quote 
70  Ibid 
71 Eisenmann and Verdier (2007 )at 487-490 
72 World Bank, (2008)  
73 See generally, Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade Article 11(2), (4) and (5); Article 12:2; TRIPS 
Agreement Articles 7; 8, 65,  66 and 67;  Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Article 9  
74 Working Group (2008) on Trade and Transfer of Technology - Twenty-Third Session - Note on the Meeting of 
10 March 2008 WT/WGTTT/M/23 15 May 2008 
75 World Bank Study (2008); UNCTAD World Investment Report (2000): at pp 172-174 ;also Working Group 
(ibid) WT/WGTTT/M/23 15 May 2008 
76 See generally, Freres and Mold, (2004); Working Group (2008)(supra n.Error! Bookmark not defined.);UNCTAD, LDCs 
Report (2004); Ochieng (2007)  
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3. Conclusion  
 
This paper has explored various context of use and application of the concept of ‘development’ in WTO regime. It 
reveals that trade and development complexity is rooted in the differing perspectives on how to discern and 
distinguish the conjunctive ‘development, financial and trade needs of developing countries’ within WTO law 
from the aspirations or more general development needs of developing nation’s states.  
From a trade perspective, an appreciable definition of development is ‘trade-led development for trade 
gains’. This definition focuses on everything that can enable developing countries  to ‘trade and deal’ in the local 
and global market forum - from liberalization, to trade facilitation, production and service efficiency and 
competitiveness, investment promotion and enterprise development in developing countries; and  building trade 
capacity for these though  human institutional and infrastructure capacity, trade financing, aid for trade, and 
technology transfer. Any development objective outside these should not be a trade imperative but a consideration 
that must not prejudice developing countries. To maintain this definition is to assure the sovereignty of nations, 
enhance the integrity of the trading system, ensure that development resources of other institutions and their 
mandates are not duplicated and creates a viable environment in which developing countries can pursue ‘trade-led 
development for trade gains’. 
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